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11 Introduction
...an initiation into the love of
learning, of learning how to learn,
[...] as a matter of interdisciplinary
cognition - that is, learning to know
something by its relation to
something else. (Bernstein, 1984)
My research interest is to understand the decision-making processes of economic
agents. Decisions and how we come up with them are at the very heart of explaining
economic behavior. According to traditional economic theory, decisions are the result
of a logical process in which inputs are evaluated. However it has for long been ac-
cepted that emotions, feelings and other psychological factors influence our decisions
(cf. Adam Smith in his The Theory of Moral Sentiments). In my thesis as well as
my ongoing research I argue that emotions and other psychological factors influence
behavior and that this influence is not just random noise but an essential part of the
decision making process. Knowing about the influences of these factors will help us
to understand and model economic behavior.
In my research I have concentrate on two kinds of choice situations. The first
topic concerned the impact of personality and experienced and anticipated emotions
on choice situation of monetary investment. This relates to important issues concerning
saving and investment behavior of private and professional investors. In the following I
will not focus on this work. Lately I have worked mostly on topics investigating which
factors influence and create cooperation and trust in one-shot interactions. This relates
to trust in anonymous market settings (i.e. the internet) and policy implications to
increase contributions to public goods. Over the last years I had the chance to work on
the topic of social ties in economic interactions that received financing from an ANR
grant (JCJC). Studying social ties among families, friends, colleagues and neighbors
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brings another often ignored dimension into the analysis of economic interactions.
This document will review the literature on situations where economic agents know
something about their interaction partner and discuss my own contributions.
To study the determinants of decision making in the situations I am interested in,
it is necessary to observe behavior, choices and individual characteristics under con-
trolled conditions. This can be best achieved in laboratory experiments where param-
eters can be held fixed. I have conducted a large number of experimental studies with
different co-authors in different laboratory settings (Amsterdam, Geneva, Nottingham,
Toulouse, Lyon). Results from these studies have resulted in a number of papers that
I will present below. Many of these use novel experimental techniques or subject
pools and have already been numerously cited in the literature (Web of Science cita-
tion report: 339; h-index: 8). Results have been regularly presented at international
conferences in Europe and the US.
2 Motivation: why social ties?
Most economic interactions concern situations where two or more people meet and
interact. A seller is approached by a buyer either on a market, in a store or over
the internet. An employer bargains with his employee. A group of fishermen meets
in the harbor before going on sea. During some of these interactions the involved
parties might have a long history together and might know each other well. In other
interactions the involved people might have never met before but see the face, dress
and body language of their interaction partner. In again other situations they might not
see each other but hear the other persons voice (over the phone) or see their photograph
on a website (over the internet). The different pieces of information we gather about
our interaction partners are used to help us build an image of him or her.
3Psychologists have for long known that men are treated differently than women,
that more beautiful and healthy looking individuals have an advantage and that we act
differently with respect to people that look similar to ourselves compared to people
that look foreign. Economists often treat such effects as biases that impede rational
decision-making. As a results economists usually focus on situations where agents
are anonymous and a number of policy recommendations concern methods to create
anonymity, for example for job candidates.
In this document I will discuss the different ways in which information about the
other might influence choices and the rational that might lie behind some of these
behaviors. I will argue that many of these seeming biases might have evolutionary
rationales that help humans make smarter decisions when interacting with others.
Indeed in some cases the influence might be due to us “learning” something about
possible skills or abilities of our interaction partner (i.e. statistical discrimination).
In other cases the influence might be due to an impact on our own concerns for this
person (i.e. other regarding preferences). Again in other situations we might learn
about the payoffs for the other and use this to predict how he will act (e.g. observing
the others’ emotions). And again in other situations the exchange of information will
serve to create some common knowledge among the involved parties that can help
to coordinate. Disentangling these different underlying motives is crucial for a good
understanding of how social interactions influence human behavior.
The document will concentrate on five different dimensions in social interactions.1
I will start with a discussion of social emotions and how they influence behavior in
interactions. I will then turn to four dimensions of increasingly precise information
about the interaction partner: reputation, visual cues, talking to the other and finally
knowing the other. The last chapter will conclude and introduce my ongoing research.
1Parts of this document have been previously published in Hopfensitz (2017).
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3 Emotions: the social glue
3.1 Overview
Since my doctoral dissertation I have been interested in how emotions influence deci-
sions in social interactions. In the following I will give an overview on the economi-
cally relevant literature on social emotions (see also Hopfensitz, 2006).
Anger is one of the emotions, most easily agreed on as being a basic emotion. Of
the emotions that are considered as more or less basic, anger is also one of the most
important for social interactions and a highly moral emotion (Haidt, 2003). The elic-
itation of anger is always related to the actions of another agent. If we get angry at
the stone on which we were hurting our toes, this is mostly because we also ascribe
some kind of agency to the stone (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000). Anger is also found to be pri-
marily related to the appraisals of unfairness and immorality (Scherer, 1997). Anger
and the avoidance of anger is part of almost any human interaction and consequently
of major interest to economists when analyzing multiple player interaction. A better
understanding of anger might help us explain, for example how and why cooperative
behavior exists. Since anger might lead to a loss of control, its anticipation in others
might lead to “nice” behavior. Anger is often seen as a negative emotion since it is
unpleasant to the individual experiencing it. But eventually it might be a very “posi-
tive” emotion, by increasing respect and consideration for others. The relation of self-
reported anger to reciprocity has already been observed in games where players can
react to unfair behavior (Bosman and van Winden, 2002). Other studies have turned
to using functional neuroimaging to study motivations for reciprocation of unfairness
(Sanfey et al., 2003; de Quervain et al., 2004).
Moral behavior has been shown to be critically linked to the ability for emotional
reactions (Anderson et al., 1999; Moll et al., 2002). While this is true for emotional
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reactivity in general, of particular importance are emotions that facilitate prosocial be-
havior (prosocial emotions such as shame, guilt and empathic emotions, e.g. Bowles
and Gintis, 2005). They do so by inducing a feeling of discomfort when doing some-
thing that violates one’s values or norms, or those of other agents whose opinion one
cares about. Shame and guilt are both ‘self-reproach” emotions elicited by the indi-
viduals’ own blameworthy actions (Ortony et al., 1988). While they differ in multiple
dimensions concerning elicitation and action tendency, they have many similarities and
are often elicited at the same time. It is often assumed that shame and guilt differ by
the visibility of behavior. Shame is said to be triggered in social situations in which
actions are seen by others, whereas guilt is more related to internalized values and
hence is not influenced by the presence of others. However, research by psychologists
has shown that people feel shame even when their actions are unobserved (Tangney
et al., 1996), and that the experience of guilt varies considerably depending on the in-
terpersonal context (Baumeister et al., 1994). The difference between shame and guilt
seems to be mainly due to the focus. Guilt is felt when the focus is on the action,
while shame is felt if agents feel that he or she is a “bad person” (Tangney and Dear-
ing, 2002). Therefore the action tendencies of the two emotions differ. Since guilt is
focused on behavior, the emotion can lead to compensation and to an active attempt to
change the situation. Shame on the other hand can not lead to reparation, since it is
implying that the person as such is bad. The action tendency of shame will be to hide
and to get away from the situation. The difference between the emotions is that guilt
can actually lead to appeasement, while shame might make matters worse. Finally, as
with all emotions, the influence of prosocial emotions is twofold. First, the anticipa-
tion and wish for avoidance of shame and guilt might induce norm-abiding behavior.
Second, the experience of shame or guilt, after an action, might lead to behaviors to
diminish the feeling. In a social dilemma, this may happen through re-payment, future
6 3 EMOTIONS: THE SOCIAL GLUE
cooperation or avoidance of future contact with the interaction partner. If the emotions
are elicited through punishment of selfish behavior, they might inhibit retaliation and
encourage individuals to act more cooperatively in the future.
3.2 Own contributions
My own work on emotions started with the projects of my doctoral thesis. As men-
tioned in the introduction I have at the same time studied the impact of emotions in
individual choice situations and in social decisions. I will focus on the latter in this
document.
The existence and enforcement of social norms is an important mechanism for the
promotion of cooperation. As shown by a larger number of experimental studies over
the last years, cooperative behavior can persist when there is an opportunity to punish
defectors. This is leading to the question why punishment is used and through with
mechanisms it leads to future cooperation. Emotions like anger about unfairness and
shame about unjust behavior are likely to play an important role.
In a study with Frans van Winden, Gershon Ben-Shakhar and Gary Bornstein in
the Journal of Economic Psychology (Ben-Shakhar et al., 2007), we investigated the
importance of anger for the willingness to reciprocate unfair behavior. It has been
previously shown that punishment of non-cooperative behavior can induce high coop-
eration levels. With our experiment we study specifically the motivations that might
lead to such punishment. Since punishment is costly and interactions are anonymous,
rational actors should not punish. One hypothesis is that the experience of anger leads
people to disregard the costs of punishment for themselves and thus might explain the
seemingly irrational decision to punish. In addition to self-reports of anger, we mea-
sured arousal of the participants by measuring the skin conductance level during the
task. The results show that reported anger is related to arousal and anger is correlated
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with the decision to punish. Meanwhile angry arousal is not necessarily elicited im-
mediately after the action is observed, but is due to a process unfolding during the time
period before the punishment decision has to be taken.
In a study with Ernesto Reuben published in the Economic Journal (Hopfensitz
and Reuben, 2009), we investigated the role of emotions in an institution allowing for
counter punishment, i.e. where someone who got punished can punish his punisher.
In this study we show that the action tendency of anger can be countered by social
emotions, as guilt and shame. These emotions are considered to be especially unique
in humans and seem to be crucial to overcome social dilemma situations. We show
that the effectiveness of punishment also depends on the emotional reaction of the
individuals who are punished. If individuals feel anger after being punished, they
might be motivated to retaliate towards the punisher. We observe that even though
counter punishment is used by some subjects, the institution is effective and raises the
cooperation level. This is due to the fact that many punished participants abstain from
counter punishment; which can be explained by the experience of shame and guilt that
inhibits the tendency to punish back after a norm violation. Indeed we observe that
subjects that got angry from being punished and experienced shame and guilt, were
more likely to abstain from punishment, than subjects not experiencing shame and
guilt.
The role of forgiving a norm violation has lead to a further paper with Asimina
Vasalou and Jeremy Pitt in the International Journal of Human-Computer Studies
(Vasalou et al., 2008). In this paper we use the same paradigm as described above
to investigate the practical applicability of a forgiveness institution for online inter-
action. We examine whether a victim’s decrease in trust towards an unintentional or
occasional offender can be repaired in an online setting, by designing an evaluating
systems to support forgiveness.
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4 Information and reputation
4.1 Overview
Social interactions have traditionally been modelled as games by economists. Such
games can involve various people and can concern as different problems as coopera-
tion (e.g. prisoners dilemma, public good game), competition (e.g. zero-sum games)
or coordination (e.g. coordination games, battle of the sexes game). While a game
concerns one interaction, obviously interactions between the same group of people
might happen more than once. Thus players in a game might either have information
from past interaction or anticipations concerning future interactions.
Game theory has traditionally distinguished one-shot games from repeated games.
Repeated games in this context, mean interactions that have no clear end point and
where after each interaction a positive probability of a future interaction exist. Since
it is assumed that after the game is played, outcomes are revealed to the participating
players, these future interactions will thus introduce concerns for reputation among
all involved members. In contrast a one-shot interaction means, that after the game no
future interaction between the involved parties is going to happen and thus no concerns
for reputation or punishment can influence choices in this case. In many cases also any
series of interactions that has a clear end-point of this type is treated similar to a one-
shot interaction due to the principle of backward induction.
The experimental literature in economics has in this context mainly focused on sit-
uations where cooperation or helping in a game is possible (e.g. prisoners’ dilemmas,
helping and public good games). Cooperative acts are generally costly for the individ-
ual but provide a benefit for the receiver. In one shot interactions, such acts are from
an individual point of view not beneficial. However in repeated interactions, strategies
might be based on the previous choices by interaction partners and thus players that
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previously cooperated will be rewarded in the future by further cooperation opportu-
nities (Trivers, 1971). The superiority of such strategies was famously demonstrated
by Axelrod in 1984 when matching various game strategies against each other in a
tournament of repeated prisoners dilemma games (Axelrod, 1984). The clear winner
of these studies was the very simple strategy of “tit-for-tat”; do to your partner as he
has done to you in the past. Experiments have confirmed that direct reciprocity is a
prominent strategy in settings where small groups of individuals interact repeatedly
(Trivers, 1971; Binmore, 1992).
However in many settings groups are large and therefore interactions between the
same two members are rare. In such settings indirect reciprocity might start to influ-
ence players interactions. Indirect reciprocity, concerns situations where an agent (i)
has no first hand experience about another agents (j) behavior, but information about
behavior by this agent (j) when interacting with a third party (k). Such information
has been modelled as “image scores” (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005) i.e. a number that
summarises an agents previous actions in a game. And indeed experimental studies
have confirmed the idea that humans base their choices on the image score of their
interaction partner.
A number of laboratory experiments have studied behavior when previous behavior
by interaction partners is observable, specifically indirect reciprocity (e.g. Wedekind
and Milinski, 2000; Milinski et al., 2002). Seinen and Schram (2006) studied the effect
of observing the last six previous decisions made by an interaction partner in a helping
game. In this game a “helper” can give some money to a “recipient” with the benefit
being larger than the cost of giving. Since players were randomly rematched each pe-
riod, the observed information was about interactions with a third party. Giving rates
were significantly higher when it was common knowledge among players that infor-
mation about previous round behavior would be available than in a control treatment
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without this information. Also the amount of help received increased with the number
of previous helpful choices made by a participant. Thus reputation is clearly taken into
account by others, however reputation is also used strategically by agents that know
that their reputation will matter in the future.
Whether such strategic motives are taken into account when seeing reputation in-
formation is another interesting question concerning indirect reciprocity. Engelmann
and Fischbacher (2009) investigate this question in an experimental setting where
agents had only in half of the periods an observable reputation score. In the remaining
half of the periods strategic reputation building was thus not possible. About half of
the participants can be classified as strategic, i.e. helping mostly in the periods where
their behavior will be visible to others. Strategic reputation building also pays off. Par-
ticipants playing strategically earn significantly more than players that are categorized
as “weakly” strategic.
While most of these experiments are structured such that either only direct or only
indirect reputation is available to participants, real human interactions are usually char-
acterized by a mix of reputation information and first hand experience. The interaction
of direct and indirect reciprocity has been studied by Molleman et al. (2013). In their
setup participants in a helping game can either use information based on direct interac-
tions or on reputation information. Not surprisingly, first hand experience is weighted
stronger, especially when the two types of information provide conflicting evidence.
The importance of image scoring for real economic interactions is nicely illustrated
by reputation systems created by various online communities. Most online communi-
ties provide the possibility to give publicly visible “grades” to previous interaction
partners or to reward community members. A grading system is used on platforms
as ebay, other platforms (as Wikipedia) use awards that can be given to others. The
impact of receiving good grades or rewards on future interactions has been studied by
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a number of different researchers. For example van de Rijt et al. (2014) studied how
receiving one initial reward (controlled by the experimenters), influences the probabil-
ity of receiving future rewards (from other users) for Wikipedia. To study this question
a random sample of 208 Wikipedia editors among the top 1% of all editors (based on
edit counts) were endowed by the researchers with a customized award. Ninety days
later the editor pages of the 208 treated editors were sampled and compared to the
pages of 313 non-treated editors that were initially similarly ranked. While 31% of
the control editors received another award in this period, 40% of the treated editors
received another award. However it is unclear whether these effects were due to an
increase in motivation for the participants receiving positive feedback or solely based
on the increased reputation score of these people. To control for this and to focus on
situations that actually require some kind of cooperation, van Apeldoorn and Schram
(2016) focused on ratings and behavior in an online community where members vol-
unteer to host others (free of charge) that are travelling to their city. Specifically a
number of artificial profiles was created that differed solely with respect to how many
times the member had previously offered the service to others from the community.
Ratings were therefore not a signal of trustworthiness of the member, but a sign of
previous cooperative acts of the member. The studied online community had at the
time of the study about 5.5 million members worldwide and can thus be considered
a great success. As theories of image scoring would suggest the profiles that showed
a history of previous contributions to the online community received more than dou-
ble as many positive responses when sending out a request themselves, compared to a
neutral profile.
The importance of reputation in public good situations is also illustrated by Yoeli
et al. (2013) that study the willingness to participate in a campaign to prevent black-
outs (SmartAC). This program aims at residents of Northern California to volunteer to
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restrict their demand from central air conditioners on days of unusual high demand or
unexpected plant failures. Participating in this program is voluntary and participants
contribute at a cost of comfort to themselves to a public good of their community. The
study varied whether participants were signing up for this program on sheets on which
their own name and address was visible to others or where they signed up with an
anonymous identifier. Observability tripled participation in the program. The effect
was approximately seven times larger than offering a 25$ cash incentive. The effect
was particularly large among people living in apartments (compared to houses) and
for owners (compared to renters). This is in line with the idea that reputation should
matter especially in situations where interactions are frequent or repeated for a long
time, as is the case of inhabitants of an apartment block or residents that bought their
home.
4.2 Own contributions
In my own work I have concentrated on situations where no direct reputation infor-
mation is available but where information about the group identity of the interaction
partner is made known. This information allows players to have more precise predic-
tions about their partners actions and preferences.
In collaboration with logicians and computer scientists, I have been involved in a
logical analysis of interactions by participants knowing the group identity of the other,
without being able to identify the other concretely. The developed model and its pre-
dictions is discussed in Attanasi et al. (2014) and Hopfensitz et al. (2014). We also
conducted an experimental project to test some of these predictions. The paper was
recently published in the European Economic Review (Attanasi et al., 2016). Results
from this project suggest that (subjective) social ties crucially influence behavior in
coordination games where a group goal is in conflict with an individual goal. Partic-
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ipants interacted in games in which we varied the degree to which they were tied to
their interaction partners. Specifically we study the impact of social ties on behav-
ior in two types of asymmetric coordination games. Social ties are varied by making
players interact with partners from different in-groups (fellow members of their own
sports team, members of their sports club, students of their university). In addition to
this “objective” manipulation, we also elicited subjective evaluations of the degree to
which participants considered the group as well interconnected. We find that smaller
and more salient in-groups lead to significantly more group beneficial choices. The
same effect is observed for players that report high values of their subjective social
ties. The paper discusses how these results relate to the idea that socially tied individ-
uals follow some group beneficial reasoning.
A second line of projects that studied the reaction to interaction partners from a
specific group are collaborations with Pepita Miquel-Florensa (Toulouse School of
Economics) and Cesar Mantilla (IAST) to investigate the importance of joint group
membership and the resulting joint social ties on economic behavior for real economic
agents, namely coffee farmers and fishermen. During a first part of the project we
conducted controlled laboratory experiments with coffee farmers in Costa Rica to in-
vestigate the impact of their group membership on cooperation and trust in an abstract
laboratory experiment. Results from this study were published in the Journal of Insti-
tutional Economics (Hopfensitz and Miquel-Florensa, 2017).
The paper analyzes how Costa Rican coffee farmer’s behavior in an experimental
public good game depends on the institutional structure of the farmers buying point
(cooperative vs. privately owned mills), and on the background of their game partners
(partners selling to the same type of mill or not). We find that cooperative farmers
do not display more public good orientation than private market farmers when play-
ing with partners from the same type of mill. However, even though farmers sell-
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ing to private mills make no difference with respect to the background of partners,
farmers selling to cooperatives significantly decrease contributions when paired with
non-cooperative members. We also study how self-selection into a mechanism that
punishes the lowest contributors effects contributions both inside the group and with
partners of the opposite background, and we show that it increases contributions by
cooperative farmers interacting with non-cooperative farmers by more than 100%.
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5.1 Overview
Is the used car seller going to cheat me? Is the employee going to be able to perform
the required tasks? Is the creditor going to pay back his loan? Many immediate ques-
tions in social interaction turn around the expected behavior by others. Behavior might
be due to a specific strategy followed by the other or due to constraints and abilities
of the other. Collecting information about an interaction partner has very often the
goal of informing us about likely behavior by the other. When no verifiable infor-
mation is available, people often use statistical extrapolation to infer likely behavior.
If women or foreigners are more likely to posses a specific trait, seeing a woman or
hearing a foreign name might trigger beliefs that this specific person is also going
to have these traits. Statistical discrimination is most likely to occur with respect to
groups that have a clear reputation and where group membership can be easily ob-
served. Not surprisingly the literature of statistical discrimination has mainly focused
on gender and race. Both gender and race are easily deduced from seeing or hearing
another person and even more abstract information like the persons name, handwriting
or address can be used. However seeing or hearing another person also leads us to
use the “non-verbal” communication transmitted by gestures, mimic or tone of voice
to anticipate the interaction partners behavior. Studying these impacts is especially
interesting for economists that traditionally tend to consider such information to be
either “cheap talk” (i.e. messages that are aimed at convincing the other party to do
something, with no real commitment behind) or as uninformative noise. However
people are surprisingly consistent in evaluations of others based on seeing them and
there is now increasing evidence that they are also better than chance in predicting the
true underlying strategies that will be used by the other player (in certain interaction
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settings).
The most commonly investigated setting, concerns the judgment of other peoples
trustworthiness. Specifically if we assume that trust is increasing overall welfare, but
can get exploited by untrustworthy others, individuals that can detect trustworthiness
will have an advantage over those that can’t. Interesting evidence for a real world
application of this ability is a study on vote buying behavior in Paraguay (Finan and
Schechter, 2012). In many countries where ideological differences between parties are
small, vote buying can have a large importance for election outcomes. Vote buying
describes the exchange of small personal gifts against a promise to vote for a specific
party. If votes are anonymous the person “buying” the vote thus has to believe that the
promise will be kept. Thus it is in a candidates” interest to focus on those voters that
are likely to reciprocate the gift. Finan and Schechter investigate data from a household
survey and a middleman survey (those that actually do the vote buying for politicians)
for the case of Paraguay. Based on the household survey, reciprocity was measured
for voters based on the share they returned as second mover in a trust game. This
measure of reciprocity was significantly influencing the probability that this individual
was offered something in exchange for their vote. Thus middle men seem able to
detect reciprocal individuals and use this information when targeting their vote buying
activities.
Trustworthiness judgments based on seeing human faces are fast. When seeing
a face for less than 100ms, ratings are essentially the same as when given unlimited
time to look at the face (Willis and Todorov, 2006; Todorov et al., 2009). Generally
photographs of faces seem to be consistently rated concerning their trustworthiness, i.e.
people in general agree on what a trustworthy face looks like. And already 5 to 6 year
old children, are at the level of adults’ consistency (Cogsdill et al., 2014). Agreement
can also be observed across cultures. Rule et al. (2010) asked American and Japanese
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participants to rate faces of U.S. and Japanese political candidates. Ratings of faces
showed large agreement, regardless of culture.
Trustworthiness judgements, based on facial features also influence real choices.
For example the decision to send money to the depicted person in a trust game (van’t
Wout and Sanfey, 2008). In this one shot game, one player is endowed with a sum
of money, and informed that he has the opportunity to transfer part of that money to
another player. If he does so, the amount she transfers is multiplied by a factor (e.g.
3) and given to the second player. The second player can now choose to transfer back
some of this multiplied amount. The first players decision thus amount to deciding
whether he will trust the other player with his money.
The effect persists to influence choices even after direct experience. In a repeated
setup, initial trustworthiness ratings were observed to be updated by own experience
but keep influencing decisions even after multiple rounds (Chang et al., 2010).
The facial features influencing character ratings are often triggered by cues that
carry some valid information about the person: for example facial symmetry as a sig-
nal of fitness (Zebrowitz and Rhodes, 2004). However conclusions about the actual
information content of such signals have to be often critically viewed. For example
facial width to height ratio is often referred to as a signal of aggressiveness (Carre and
McCormick, 2008; Stirrat and Perrett, 2010) however recent data has been questioning
this relationship (Deaner et al., 2012; Gomez-Valdes et al., 2013).
Whether actual trustworthiness can be reliably detected from faces is still con-
troversial (Yamagishi et al., 2003; Verplaetse et al., 2007; Efferson and Vogt, 2013).
Trustworthiness detection might be based on signals about the thought process or pref-
erences of an actor that are mirrored in his face while contemplating the choices. For
these kinds of signals it is necessary to study the effect of photographs or movies taken
while the interaction partner takes his decision. And indeed some studies have ob-
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served this ability (Verplaetse et al., 2007; Willis and Todorov, 2006). Trustworthiness
detection might also use cues that are related to the interaction partners’ personality
and general disposition to be trustworthy. In this case any kind of observation about
the other should carry useful information. We will get back to this in the next section.
Strongly related to trustworthiness judgments, are the expressed emotions in a per-
sons face. Specifically smiling faces (photos and videos) elicit high trust. Scharlemann
et al. (2001) used still pictures and observed that participants trust more when seeing a
smiling image of their partner. Johnston et al. (2010) use video clips and observe more
trust in response to enjoyment smiles. Enjoyment or “genuine” smiles are not under
straightforward voluntary control. Since the work of Duchenne de Boulogne (1862)
and Darwin (1872) many researchers have attempted to identify objective measures of
“honest” smiles, concluding that genuine smiles are characterized by use of the orbicu-
laris oculi (the muscle surrounding the eyes) in combination with the zygomatic major
(raising the corners of the mouth); symmetry is also an important characteristic. More
recent research focuses on the importance of temporal dynamics such as smile onset,
apex, and offset durations (Krumhuber et al., 2007).
Mehu et al. (2007) assess which characteristics are associated with honest smiles
by rating fifty faces across ten attributes. It turns out that Duchenne smiles play a
significant role in the assessment of generosity and extraversion.
Concerning situations requiring trust, non-verbal communication might thus be
informative with respect to personality characteristics, the current decision process
of the decision maker and to the constraints that the decision maker is facing. Trust
evaluations are mainly influential for situations in which contracts cannot be enforced
and thus were penalizing a norm or contract violator is not possible. Another problem
arises in situations where punishment is possible. Indeed punishment of norm violators
that free-ride on others has been observed to be a very powerful instrument to motivate
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pro-social behavior (Fehr and Gaechter, 2000). However punishment can also lead
to welfare losses (Egas and Riedl, 2008), especially if punishment is unconstrained
and those that feel treated unfairly can retaliate with counter-punishment (Nikiforakis,
2008). Punishment in these settings is usually costly to the individual punishing and
can thus not be explained from an own material welfare maximizing point of view.
However norm violations have been observed to very reliably trigger emotions. An
ability to detect an interaction partner’s disposition to feel such emotions might thus
be informative to judge the “probability” of being punished. The ability to judge an
interaction partners costs and abilities for punishment might be informative to judge
the potential expected “damage” from punishment. The two dimensions seem not
uncorrelated. Sell et al. (2009) hypothesize that individuals with enhanced abilities to
inflict costs have a better bargaining position in conflicts and consequently they might
be more prone to anger.
The face seems to carry information that enables participants to detect who will
reject a low offer in an ultimatum game (van Leeuwen et al., 2017). The same study
observed that own facial asymmetry is positively correlated with getting angry after
receiving a low offer, as well as with the decision to reject a low offer. Furthermore
observers correctly perceive facial asymmetry as a cue for getting angry after norm
violations, though they underestimate the magnitude of the correlation.
5.2 Own contributions
In my own work I have focused on the question of how trust in an interaction partner is
influenced when some (visual) information about the partner is provided. These ques-
tions were investigated by a number of research projects that were financed through
my ANR grant on the influence of social ties in economic interactions.
We specifically studied the identification of partners in a trust game through pic-
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tures and movie sequences. Partners in economic trust games are usually completely
anonymous and if they are identifiable (e.g. by partners revealing their identity) the
information transmitted is not specifically analyzed. We created an experimental setup
in which second movers in the trust game were asked to send a video message to first
movers. While the partner in the trust game became thus identifiable, interactions
stayed anonymous since participants were from different places in Europe and could
not find out who their actual interaction partner was. We analyze at the same time
the information carried in the visual signal of the movie clip, as the parameters that
influence first movers decision of trust.
The importance of smiles in such interactions and the signaling role of such smiles
is discussed in (Centorrino et al., 2015a) published in Evolution and Human Behavior
and (Centorrino et al., 2015b) published in Adaptive Human Behavior and Physiology.
Specifically we test the hypothesis that smiles perceived as honest serve as a signal
that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust. Poten-
tial trustees (84 participants from Toulouse, France) made two video clips averaging
around 15 seconds for viewing by potential senders before the latter decided whether
to “send” or “keep” a lower stake (4 euros) or higher stake (8 euros). Senders (198 par-
ticipants from Lyon, France) made trust decisions with respect to the recorded clips.
If money was sent to the trustee, stakes were tripled and trustees could decide to keep
all, two thirds or one half of the tripled stakes. Clips were further rated concerning
the genuineness of the displayed smiles. We observe that smiles rated as more gen-
uine strongly predict judgments about the trustworthiness of trustees, and willingness
to send them money. We observe a relation between costs and benefits: smiles from
trustees playing for higher stakes are rated as significantly more genuine. Finally, we
show that those rated as smiling genuinely return more money on average to senders.
An increase of one standard deviation in rating of smile genuineness is associated with
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an unconditional expected gain of about one dollar and thirty cents to senders in the
two trials of the experiment.
While this project focused on movie sequences, we studied still pictures in a series
of experiments with psychologists Jean-Francois Bonnefon andWim de Neys. In a first
paper we investigated the modularity of trustworthiness detection from photographs
and the factors driving trustworthiness detection (Bonnefon et al., 2013).
Specifically it has been conjectured that people of higher intelligence are better
able to detect signs of untrustworthiness from potential partners. In contrast, our arti-
cle reports five trust game studies suggesting that reading trustworthiness of the faces
of strangers is a modular process. Trustworthiness detection from faces is independent
of general intelligence and effortless. Pictures that include non-facial features such as
hair and clothing impair trustworthiness detection by increasing reliance on conscious
judgments, but people largely prefer to make decisions from this sort of pictures. In
sum, trustworthiness detection is a genuine and effortless ability, possessed in equal
amount by people of all cognitive capacities, but whose impenetrability leads to inac-
curate conscious judgments and inappropriate informational preferences.
We then discuss the role of markers as the second-to-fourth digit ratio in the ability
for trustworthiness detection in De Neys et al. (2013). Testosterone administration ap-
pears to make individuals less trusting, and this effect has been interpreted as an adap-
tive adjustment of social suspicion, that improved the accuracy of trusting decisions. In
our paper, we consider another possibility, namely that testosterone increases the sub-
jective cost of being duped, decreasing the propensity to trust without improving the
accuracy of trusting decisions. In line with this hypothesis, we show that second-to-
fourth digit ratio (2D:4D, a proxy for effects of testosterone on the foetus) correlates
with the propensity to trust, but not with the accuracy of trusting decisions. Trust
game players (N = 144) trusted less when they had lower 2D:4D (high prenatal testos-
22 5 SEEING THE OTHER
terone), but their ability to detect the strategy of other players was constant (and better
than chance) across all levels of digit ratio. Our results suggest that early prenatal or-
ganizing effects of testosterone in the foetus might impair rather than boost economic
outcomes, by promoting indiscriminate social suspicion.
In a paper in the Journal of Economic Psychology (De Neys et al., 2015) we then
investigate the development of this ability in adolescents. We focus on situations in
which adolescents make a decision whether to trust an unknown adult. Adolescents
aged 13 to 18 (N = 540) played a trust game, in which they made decisions whether to
trust unknown adults based on their picture. We show that trusting decisions become
increasingly accurate with age, from a small effect size at age 13 to an effect size 2.5
times larger at age 18.
Results from these studies and implications for trustworthiness detection are fur-
ther discussed in Bonnefon et al. (2015), Bonnefon et al. (2017a) and Bonnefon et al.
(2017b).
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6 Talking to the other
6.1 Overview
When agents talk many things happen. Most obviously information is transmitted from
the speaker to the listener. But this information might consist in much more than in
the meaning of the words that are exchanged. The tone of the voice might carry many
additional signals. That these signals are informative and detected by others has been
observed for the voice of women over the menstrual cycle. Pipitone and Gallup (2008)
recorded voice samples by women at different moments of their menstrual cycle. Re-
sults showed a significant increase in voice attractiveness ratings as the estimated risk
of conception increased across the menstrual cycle in naturally cycling women. In
line with this, there was no effect observed for women using hormonal contraceptives.
While men find higher pitch voices in women to be more attractive, feminine and
healthier (e.g. Feinberg et al., 2008), women have been observed to find men with low
pitch to be more attractive (e.g. Collins, 2000). Lower voice pitch in men has even
been observed to be related to higher reproductive success in a population of hunter
gatherers (Apicella et al., 2007). Preference for low pitched voice in men has also been
observed with respect to political candidates (Tigue et al., 2012) and might influence
behavior in many other circumstances.
In addition to the explicit and implicit information transmitted by speech, public
announcements might be even informative when all implied parties already had the
announced information. Specifically speech is very well suited to generate common
knowledge. Not only does each agent posses some information, but also all agents
know that all the others have this information and that these others know that others
also have the information and so on... Common knowledge is especially useful in
coordination games. In a coordination game Alice will try to act the same way as
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Bob. But at the same time she knows that Bob will try to act the same way as Alice.
To break through this cycle, information that is common to all players might act as a
coordination device. Many real life situations involve coordination. And what might
otherwise be considered as not-informative communication (for example advertising)
might indeed serve to create common knowledge. Advertising broadcasted during
SuperBowl (i.e. advertising that many people will see and that people know that many
others will see) comes especially often from products that would profit from common
knowledge (e.g. a new technology that is only interesting if also many others use it,
see Chwe, 2013).
Having heard someone speak something out loud, further informs us about how
committed the person will be in the future to do as he or she said. Most people are much
more likely to stick with a decision once it has been announced loudly. Reasons are a
motivation to keep a reputation of being consistent and reliable, but also an avoidance
of situations generating cognitive dissonance. This has been modelled by economists
as “guilt aversion”. I.e. the anticipation of feeling bad after breaking a promise and the
subsequent tendency to stick with what was said during cheap talk (e.g. Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2006; Charness and Grosskopf, 2004). Ideally the study of cheap talk
concerns “how people skeptically, but reasonably and mostly conventionally, interpret
language. It is the study of rational people who know how to communicate in the
ordinary way.” (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). And this implies that messages that are
“cheap” (i.e. by not influencing the players payoffs) can nevertheless influence players
choices in what they communicate and how they react to it. And this can, in turn,
influence also payoffs.
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6.2 Own contribution
I recently started investigating the importance of communicating in different strategic
environments. In this project with Aljaz Ule we focus on symbolic communication
that ex-ante is void of meaning. Specifically we know that face to face, free form, or
restricted communication improve coordination and cooperation in simple experimen-
tal games. In typical experimental studies subjects are offered a commonly understood
communication medium and often use it to increase economic efficiency. Here we in-
vestigate whether communication increases efficiency even when there is ex-ante no
common meaning, and whether it may endogenously emerge. Experimental subjects
repeatedly play economic games with strangers, and may exchange abstract symbols
during each game. We see that symbolic exchange increases coordination and coop-
eration. We then investigate whether groups of strangers assign the same meaning to
the same symbol and observe that this is more likely to happen in difficult economic
games. We conclude that an economic challenge motivates emergence of meaningful
communication.
In another recent collaboration with anthropologists and linguists (Arnaud Tognetti
and Melissa Barkat-Defradas) we will study markers in voice samples of participants
in a two player Public Good game. Choices in the public good game were either condi-
tional or unconditional and thus allow us to disentangle conditional from unconditional
cooperators. Each participant further recorded multiple voice samples that either con-
sisted in repeating a given sentence or speaking freely. Initial analysis suggests that
pitch variation in the voice samples is negatively correlated with contributions to the
public good.
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7 Knowing the other
7.1 Overview
Besides hearing gossip, seeing and talking with others, most importantly we “know”
many of the agents we interact with. This knowing implies that we have information
about preferences, skills and habits of the other with much less error proneness than
from the previously discussed indirect channels. Note that these translate into informa-
tion about the others’ payoffs for different outcomes (preferences), his or her strategy
set (skills) and the to be expected strategy (habits). However knowing the other player
will also influence our own preferences. As when we play with someone we really
care about (and thus his utility will positively influence our utility) versus interacting
with someone we dislike (with an inverse relationship between utilities). We thus have
to differentiate between interactions between unknown players and between players
that have a history of previous interactions. Having such “social ties” does not neces-
sarily imply that the players will cooperate more or trust each other more. Dependent
on the previous interaction history, a novel interaction will be influenced in one or the
other way (e.g. van Dijk and van Winden, 1997). The valuation of others has been ob-
served to be positively influenced for example by a history of successful interactions
in a public good environment (van Dijk et al., 2002).
Harm done to someone we care about can feel like harm to ourselves. So-called
‘mirror neurons’ can lead for people with strong social ties to emotional experiences
very similar to the actual experience of an observed person (Singer and Frith, 2005;
Singer et al., 2004). For example when one partner of a couple received slight electric
shocks, neuroimaging confirmed that actual pain was experienced by the observing
partner. Thus what economists call “other regarding preferences” might indeed be
reinforced by biological factors making the others pain our own.
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While obviously we are influenced where our interaction partner is a friend, col-
league or acquaintance, similar mechanisms are at work when we interact with a person
from a specific group that we know. This “in-group” versus “out-group” bias has re-
ceived much attention in economics and psychology. The observation that such biases
exist even in situations where grouping is more or less arbitrary, lead to the develop-
ment of the so-called “minimal-group paradigm” (Tajfel et al., 1971). Indeed the work
by Tajfel and co-authors was initially aiming at studying behavior between “meaning-
less” groups to be able to sequentially add relevant group information in order to find
which characteristics actually lead to discrimination between groups. The surprising
finding was, that even when group identity is based on quasi-arbitrary allocation (e.g.
picture preferences or a coin flip), group discrimination was observed. Since then,
the paradigm has been used in a multitude of studies to investigate the mechanisms
of group discrimination (e.g. Brewer, 1979,9; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Yamagishi and
Kiyonari, 2000). Evidence now converges to the insight that biases are mainly leading
to in-group favoritism and less often to out-group punishment and such behavior has
been linked to the presence of the neuropeptide oxytocin.
“Oxytocin plays an important role during and after childbirth, facilitating birth,
maternal bonding, and lactation. Oxytocin has been observed to play a role in pair
bonding and situations requiring mutual trust and is therefore sometimes referred to as
the ‘bonding hormone’. In studies on minimal groups, oxytocin has been observed to
lead to a ‘tend and defend’ response in that it promoted in-group trust and cooperation,
and defensive, but not offensive, aggression toward competing out-groups” (De Dreu
et al., 2010). Thus a biological mechanism linked to bonding is through its impact on
in-group favoritism also causing intergroup biases. Favoritism easily triggers negative
emotions and protest in those that feel disfavored and thus oxytocin might trigger a
chain reaction leading to between group conflict. Ethnocentrism is thus to a certain
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degree the result of an adaptive process that helps individuals and their groups, but
that unfortunately has also negative consequences by generating intergroup bias and
conflict (De Dreu et al., 2011).
A very specific group of interaction partners, are members of our own family. Bi-
ology and anthropology has for long studied the theoretical and actual interactions
between genetically related individuals, but also family economics has in recent years
departed from the traditional view that a household is simply “one” economic decision
maker. Economic models are traditionally much less concerned with the actual ge-
netic relatedness but see the household as a social structure based on institutions like
marriage and legal contracts. The biological approach is mainly based on the concept
of kin-selection, i.e. that individually costly behavior might benefit the individuals’
genes if beneficiaries are genetically related. Hamilton’s rule popularized this concept
in mathematical terms and specifies that genes can increase in frequency when the ge-
netic relatedness of a recipient to an agent multiplied by the benefit to the recipient
is greater than the reproductive cost to the agent. Kin selection is often cited when
explaining individual costly altruistic behavior. Helping others at a cost or fighting to
protect the life of others, might be thus costly for the individual but the cost is outweigh
by the benefits to the individuals genes carried in those that receive the help.
If “genetically related” is thus generating one sort of group, the corresponding out-
group can be seen as those that are “not-genetically related”. While this concept is
obviously less clearly defined, since even with individuals that are not direct relatives
we do share a majority of our genes, it nevertheless can influence behavior. Specifically
reproduction partners should ideally be no close relatives, as so called “inbreeding” in-
creases the chances of offspring being affected by recessive or deleterious traits. And
indeed portraits that are modified such as to seem “less” related to the individual are
generally rated as more attractive (DeBruine et al., 2011). Also the body smell of indi-
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viduals with dissimilar genotypes has been observed to be preferred. This mechanism
is linked to a set of genes (the major histocompatibility complex (MHC)) that plays
an important role in the human immune system. Humans have been shown to prefer
the body odor of potential partners that have a different MHC, which will thus result
in offspring benefiting from two different types of immune systems (Wedekind et al.,
1995). The impact of this preference can be also observed with respect to artificial
smells, like perfumes. Notably large individual differences concerning perfume pref-
erences exist among humans. These preferences are also remarkably stable over the
lifetime. When participants are asked to report for perfumes whether they would like
to use them for themselves, ingredients in the preferred perfumes have been shown to
imitate and enhance signals from the persons’ natural smell (Milinski and Wedekind,
2001).
Family members are obviously a combination of people that are closely related to
us (parents, siblings and children) but also unrelated individuals (our partner and the
partners of our siblings and children). That nevertheless all family members are part
of a specific group is related to legal and cultural constraints that apply to it. Family
members have specific rights but also obligations with respect to each other. Conse-
quently economists have for long modelled the family as one decision making unit,
without investigating how preferences or choices of a family come about. Specifically
most models assume that a household is able to reach a Pareto efficient allocation, i.e.
that it is not possible to find another allocation that could increase simultaneously the
welfare of all household members. Relatedly many models assume that households
do “income-pooling”, i.e. the income of all household members is pooled and then
allocated to its members according to a household specific sharing rule. Experimental
evidence is now suggesting that households do not always reach efficient outcomes and
that they do not always aim at maximizing the households income pool (for a survey
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see Munro, 2017). Relatedly sociological studies often confirm that family members
have often conflicting preferences. Contributions in a public good game are for exam-
ple observed to be higher among family members than among strangers but not at the
full level of cooperation (e.g. Peters et al., 2004). And spouses were more willing to
invest in a public good when they considered themselves as having more control over
the final allocation across partners (Mani, 2010).
7.2 Own contribution
In a series of experiments I have studied situations related to trust and cooperation in
households.
In a first study with Helene Couprie and Francois Cochard published in the Re-
view of Economics of the Household (Cochard et al., 2016) we observed behavior in a
social dilemma played by spouses. We present results from an economic experiment
conducted with 100 co-habiting heterosexual couples. We compare defection behavior
in the prisoner’s dilemma within real couples to pairs of strangers. One out of four par-
ticipants chose not to cooperate with their spouse. To understand why spouses might
prefer defection, we use a novel allocation task to elicit the individual’s trade-off be-
tween efficiency and equality within a couple. We further investigate the impact of
socio-demographic and psychological characteristics of the couples. We find in partic-
ular that lack of preferences for joint income maximization, having children and being
married lead to higher defection rates in the social dilemma.
A follow up study concerning behavior of spouses has been conducted in 2010
financed through a Franco-German ANR grant and lead to an intercultural compar-
ison of the tradeoff of efficiency versus equality in the two countries (Beblo et al.,
2015). The paper presents the results of an experiment measuring social preferences
within couples in a context where intra-household pay-off inequality can be reduced
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at the cost of diminishing household income. We measure social norms regarding this
efficiency-equality trade-off by reported beliefs about the behavior of peers, and we
implement a cross-country comparison between France and Germany. In particular,
we show that German households are more income-inequality averse and thus less
income-maximizing than French households. Decomposition reveals that diverging
sample compositions in the two countries drive less than half of the difference, while
over half of the initial French/German difference remains unexplained. Beliefs differ
significantly from observed behavior in both countries. Income-maximizing choices
are overestimated in the German sample and underestimated in the French.
Further data from this second study concerns the contributions to a joint public
good for the family when the experimental setting required real effort investment and
allowed for a leisure option. The corresponding paper (Cochard et al., 2017) is forth-
coming in Experimental Economics. The aim of the project is to investigate specializa-
tion by men and women in a household. Female specialization on household work and
male specialization on labor-market work is a widely observed phenomenon across
time and countries. This absence of gender neutrality with respect to work-division
is known as the “work-division puzzle”. Gender differences regarding characteristics
(preferences, productivity) and context (wage rates, social norms) are generally recog-
nized as competing explanations for this fact. We experimentally control for context
and productivity to investigate preferences for work-division by true co-habiting cou-
ples, in a newly developed specialization task. Efficiency in this task comes at the cost
of inequality, giving higher earnings to the “advantaged” player. We compare behav-
ior when men (or women) are in the advantaged position, which corresponds to the
traditional (or power) couple case where he (or she) earns more. We show that women
do not contribute more than men to the household public good whatever the situation.
This result allows us to rule out some of the standard explanations of the work-division
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puzzle.
Finally in a recent project with anthropologist Jon Stieglitz (Stieglitz et al., 2017),
we used the distribution task to study choices in a subsistence population (namely the
Tsimane of Bolivia). Using this experimental distribution task stipulating a trade-off
between household efficiency and spousal equality in allocating surpluses of meat and
money, we examine factors influencing spousal distribution preferences among Tsi-
mane forager-horticulturalists of Bolivia (n = 53 couples). Our primary goal is to
understand whether and how access to perfectly fungible and liquid resources (which
increases with greater participation in market economies) shifts intra-household dis-
tribution preferences. We hypothesize that greater fungibility of money compared to
meat results in greater squandering of money for individual fitness gain at a cost to
the family. Money therefore requires costly strategies to insure against a partner’s
claims for consumption. Whereas nearly all Tsimane spouses prefer efficient meat dis-
tributions, we find a substantially reduced efficiency preference for money compared
to meat controlling for potential confounders. Reported marital conflict over pater-
nal disinvestment is associated with a nearly 13-fold increase in odds of revealing a
selfish money distribution preference. Selfish husbands are significantly more likely
than other husbands to be paired with selfish wives. Lastly, Tsimane husbands and
wives are more likely than Western Europeans to prefer an efficient money distribu-
tion, but Tsimane wives are more likely than Western European wives to exhibit a
selfish preference. In sum, preferences for the distribution of household production
surplus support joint and separate interests views of marriage; a hybrid approach best
explains how ecological-, family-, and individual-level factors influence spousal pref-
erences through their effects on perceptions of marginal gains within and outside the
household.
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8 Conclusion and future work
8.1 Conclusion
Gossip, seeing, hearing and knowing our interaction partner is often dismissed by
economists as uninformative noise or cheap talk. In this document I have tried to
give an idea of why many of the influences and “biases” that have been observed with
respect to our interaction partners, might be actually more than that. Due to its impor-
tance in almost all interaction, we need to take into account what agents “assume” to
know about their interaction partner and what they “do” know (through previous inter-
actions). Doing so might turn many seemingly irrational biases into behaviors adapted
to make us interact with the right people at the right time (in the right way).
8.2 Future work
In the following I will present my recent research project. This project has received
funding through an ANR JCJC in 2015. The project aims at studying under a com-
mon framework many of the elements that have over the past years been proposed to
be added to the rational actor model, still predominantly used in economics. These
include emotions, empathy, trust, reading subtle signals from others and coordinating
on common goals based on signals related to identity or group membership. While
these elements have received individually significant attention by economists, usually
their analysis is not combined and applied to diverse populations. We suggest that the
recently popularized concept of social intelligence (or interpersonal or collective in-
telligence) combines many of these insights in a common framework (e.g. Goleman,
2007) and might thus provide valuable insights to economists and other social scien-
tists. To account for the different aspects of this sort of decision-making, the project
will be interdisciplinary in nature. It will use methods from psychology to measure
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social intelligence, social emotions, detection of emotions and theory of mind; these
methods will be complemented with observational, survey, and experimental methods
from economics, political science and anthropology.
A first necessary step in the course of this project will be a structuring of the dif-
ferent elements that constitute social intelligence and analysis of the relationship of
these elements to the traditional framing of decision situations used in economics. The
general idea of social intelligence will be sub-divided in three components, as reflected
by the following questions:
(1) how do agents know about the payoffs of other agents? Specifically if other
agents are not own payoff maximizing, an agent has to deduce or assume the utility
another agent will actually derive from various outcomes. In addition to questions
concerning the distribution of different types of people in the population, we read and
interpret reactions, emotions and other subtle signals from others. The ability to read
and interpret these signals is highly variable within and across populations and will
thus constitute a first element.
(2) how do agents know about the strategies of other agents? Under the assump-
tion of own payoff maximization, knowing the interaction partner’s payoffs implies
knowledge about the other agents preferred course of action. We will try to disen-
tangle the difference between payoffs and resulting strategies, since we believe that
the two are not necessarily leading to the same predictions. Take the example of an
agent that observes another agent getting very angry after some norm violation. Thus
the norm violation reduces the agents” payoff. However whether the response to this
anger will be punishment might be influenced by the agents” personality and physical
formidability. Part of the research question will thus focus on the interpretation of
signals from others and the ability to judge another agent’s strategies based on varying
levels of information on the agent’s phenotype.
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(3) how do agents know that others know about their strategies and payoffs? Many
decision situations carry elements of a coordination problem. Specifically other re-
garding preferences might transform what might seem like a social dilemma (e.g. a
prisoners’ dilemma) in payoff terms into a coordination problem in utility terms. Co-
ordination problems pose, however, new challenges to result in efficiency maximizing
outcomes. If it is not assured that common knowledge exists concerning every agent
facing the same game in utility terms, coordination might fail. Social intelligence, team
reasoning, altruism, prosociality, mentalizing, and beliefs of joint group-membership
might jointly overcome these problems. Our last element will thus focus on how these
strategies can influence economic interactions and outcomes.
We will study these different elements from different angles, as represented by
three work packages. The work packages are structured to group together subprojects
that approach these questions using similar methods and turn around similar funda-
mental research objectives. The first work package will revolve around questions con-
cerning the development of different social skills. This question will be approached
by studying young pre-school children to investigate the timing of the development of
these abilities. Second, in a pre-industrial society (Tsimane forager-farmers of Ama-
zonian Bolivia) we will study the ontogeny of social intelligence using observational,
survey and experimental techniques, and then compare age-specific social abilities to
those in industrialized societies. The second work package will revolve around a de-
tailed experimental analysis of the three different sub-points raised above for a general
subject pool. We will evaluate social intelligence with methods traditionally used in
psychology (e.g. personally scales, questionnaires) and combine these with behavioral
observations in experimental paradigms from economics and political science. Some
of these environments will concern situations that require assumptions about others’
payoffs (e.g. a voting situation where other voters’ payoffs from outcomes are not
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known); some require assumptions about others’ actions (e.g. in a trust or ultimatum
game where the interaction partners’ choices need to be predicted; or in a voting situ-
ation where the politicians’ actions need to be predicted); and finally some situations
will concern situations where actions of a whole group need to be anticipated or in-
fluenced (e.g. situations of strategic group building). Finally, the third work package
will approach theoretical questions concerning the situations studied in the other two
work packages. The aim is at the same time a theoretical structuring of the decision
situations to be studied, a theoretical interpretation of the empirical results we obtain
over the course of the research, and an attempt to generate novel, testable hypotheses
and predictions across diverse populations and contexts. The theoretical approach will
be related to the literature on psychological game theory (i.e. the individual’s beliefs
about others’ beliefs and emotions); theories concerning higher-order reasoning (i.e.
the beliefs about other players’ strategies and reasoning) and theories related to team
reasoning (i.e. decision criteria that take the group as a whole as reference).
8.3 Social intelligence concept
Social intelligence (or interpersonal intelligence) is part of the intelligence concept that
relates to how people interact with others (Thorndike, 1920). Generally it is assumed
that individuals who have high interpersonal intelligence are characterized by a sensi-
tivity to others’ moods, emotions, feelings, personality and motivations. This type of
intelligence should not be misunderstood to be equivalent with extraversion or liking
other people in general. Rather, those with high social intelligence communicate better
with others and are better in understanding the situation of others. In their role they
might be either leaders or followers and either using their ability for a common goal
or their own private good. The concept of social intelligence is very much linked to
emotional intelligence, i.e. the ability to perceive and evaluate one’s own and other
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people’s emotions and to discriminate between different emotions and label them ap-
propriately. Emotional intelligence also includes the ability to use this information
with respect to choices and behavior. Goleman (2007) has extended the emotional
intelligence concept to social intelligence, by proposing two elements: social aware-
ness and social facility. Social awareness implies understanding others’ feelings and
intentions, sensing non-verbal emotional signals and knowledge about how the social
world works. Social facility is the ability to use insights from social awareness to allow
for fitness-enhancing interactions. It includes effective presentation of oneself, shap-
ing the outcome of social interactions and caring about others and acting accordingly
(Goleman, 2007). Also related is the concept of collective intelligence (Woolley et al.,
2010) that might explain a group’s performance on a wide variety of tasks.
Traditionally social intelligence is measured by trying to evaluate ‘social cognitive’
abilities, often via questionnaires asking for self-evaluation given different scenarios
or based on knowledge of psychological mechanisms. Tests that try to evaluate social
awareness are in addition aimed at abilities linked to the “low road”, e.g. emotion
reading and empathy. Examples are tests that ask to evaluate emotional expressions
from photographs or to judge the thoughts and feelings of an interaction partner (e.g.
where the partners’ actual thoughts and feelings are also recorded).
8.4 Approach and anticipated results
The project is by nature interdisciplinary: involved researchers come with training and
expertise in experimental economics, game theory, logic, social psychology, develop-
mental psychology, anthropology and political science. Most involved researchers are
(or were) also affiliated with the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
The project includes a number of experimental projects. Results from this project
will enhance our understanding of the interaction of the different elements constitut-
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ing what is known as social intelligence and behavior in different types of decision
situations. Results will thus be at the same time pertinent for researchers interested in
the general context of social intelligence, but will also provide valuable insights to the
respective disciplines, especially economics.
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Francois Bonnefon 
 - OrNE3 – funding for experiments from the MSH Toulouse (5000 euros) 
 
2013: - ANR research grant: “Kin, Kith and moral cognition”, (K2MC) with Gwenael Kaminski (project 
leader) (143990 euros) 
 - One year research grant (delegation CNRS) 
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